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JURISDICTION OF COURT 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of 
Divorce from which this appeal is taken, were entered by the First 
Judicial District Court Judge on October 11, 1989. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed November 3, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article 
VIII Section 1 et seq., Utah Constitution; Section 78-2a-l et seq. Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended); and Rule 3, R. Utah Ct. App. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal, by Plaintiff, from a Decree of Divorce signed 
by Judge Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial District Court, Cache 
County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Respondent differs with some of the statement of facts set 
forth in the Appellant's Brief. The additional facts are 
set forth below. Paragraph numbers correspond with the 
numbers in Appellant's statement of the facts.) 
4. Plaintiff testified that in a nine-week period she earned 
approximately $2,147.00 or approximately $238.50 a week, (May 
transcript, page 63, lines 9-20; page 64, lines 4-12). 
5. Plaintiff is trained and has been a licensed beautician for 
thirteen years, and has made no effort to obtain employment at a beauty 
salon. (May transcript, page 75, lines 24-25; page 76, lines 
1-7). 
7. The Court calculated Plaintiff's income at $800.00 plus (June 
transcript, page 19, lines 9-11). The Court felt she demonstrated 
employability at that rate (June transcript, page 20, lines 1-10). 
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8. Defendant currently has no over-time available at Thiokol and 
none is expected in the foreseeable future (June transcript, page 89, 
lines 14-22; Defendant's Exhibit #1). Defendant's salary, or base 
income, is $14.53 an hour (May transcript, page 90, lines 2-6). The 
Court found Defendant's income at $2,505.00 based on current and 
historical income (May transcript, page 173, line 13). Defendant 
testified that his take-home pay is $1,719.00 (May transcript, page 130, 
lines 23-25; page 131, lines 1-12). Defendant works in the space 
division at Thiokol and is in some jeopardy in reference to Defendant's 
job position (May transcript, page 92, lines 1-10). 
12. Defendant is presently living with his parents (May 
transcript, page 132, lines 22-25). Defendant testified that he can't 
afford to live anywhere else (May transcript, Page 133, lines 1-4). 
Defendant's sole source of transportation is a 1969 truck that gets 
approximately five to eight miles a gallon (May transcript, page 134, 
lines 18-23). Defendant testified that based on what he has been paying 
the Plaintiff (alimony and child support), and bills, he doesn't have 
any money to do anything else with (May transcript, page 136, lines 17-
20). The Court found that Defendant's payment of child support and 
alimony obligation to Plaintiff didn't leave Defendant with what he 
needed to support himself (June transcript, page 43, lines 18-25; page 
44, lines 1-6). 
14. A retainer of $500.00 was paid to Plaintiff's counsel by 
Plaintiff. (May transcript, page 33, lines 21-23; June transcript, page 
46, lines 3-5; Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). Plaintiff was awarded $800.00 
in attorneys fees, execution stayed on the grounds that Defendant paid 
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Plaintiff $50.00 per month (June transcript, page 63, lines 15-24). The 
Court stated that it was not sure Defendant had the ability to make the 
$50.00 a month payment (June transcript, page 63, lines 21-24). The 
Court found that there were assets available by the parties for each to 
pay their own attorney fees (June transcript, page 63, lines 3-13). 
Other pertinent facts omitted by Plaintiff. 
1. The parties acquired a home during the marriage valued at 
$76,000.00 (May transcript, page 44, lines 20-25; page 46, lines 18-19; 
Paragraph 11, Findings of Fact). The payoff of the home is $25,902.59 
(Paragraph 11, Findings of Fact). Possession of the home was awarded to 
Plaintiff. Equity in said home was to be split between the parties upon 
the following events: Plaintiff remarries, co-habitates, parties 
youngest child reaches the age of majority, or Plaintiff sells the home 
(May transcript, page 184, lines 18-22; Paragraph 11, Findings of Fact; 
Paragraph 6, Decree of Divorce). Plaintiff was awarded household 
furniture and appliances, which the Court placed at a value of $3,500.00 
(Paragraph 12, Findings of Fact; Paragraph 7, Decree of Divorce). Each 
party was awarded one-half of the First Security Bank CD and Savings 
Account ($1,231.00 and $513.26), (Paragraph 12, Decree of Divorce; 
Paragraph 8, Findings of Fact). Plaintiff was awarded a judgment 
against the Defendant in the sum of $1,175.00 (Paragraph 14, Findings of 
Fact; Paragraph 10, Decree of Divorce). Plaintiff was also awarded one-
half, or $7,897.22, in Defendant's Savings Retirement (ESIP) at Morton 
Thiokol Inc., (Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact; Paragraph 15, Decree of 
Divorce). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court findings and the evidentry records reflects 
that the trial court seriously weighed and considered the required three 
factors in formulating its alimony award of both amount and duration. 
The Court found Plaintiff to be an able-bodied person, age 35, with an 
employability rate of $800.00 per month. The Court found that the 
Defendant did not have the ability to pay more than what was awarded 
Plaintiff for child support and alimony. Given these factors, the Court 
crafted an alimony award which would allow Plaintiff time to get back in 
the work force or obtain the necessary education to develop the 
necessary skills to enhance her employability. This alimony award was 
made for the purpose of ensuring the economic survival of both parties 
and to maintain a lifestyle for Plaintiff as near as possible to what 
she had experienced during the parties marriage, considering Defendants 
ability to provide. 
2. The recent Utah Court of Appeals decision of Motes v. Motes, 
786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) does not require the trial court to order 
a custodial parent to execute a Section 152 Declaration. Nevertheless, 
the Court found that the Defendant had a greater income than the 
Plaintiff, Defendant provided the majority of the income to the children 
and Defendant could maximize the greatest financial benefit from the 
exemptions. The trial court clearly used discretion in awarding 
Defendant two of the children for tax exemption purposes. 
3. The record reflects that Plaintiff has assets available to pay 
her costs and attorney fees. Defendant does not have additional monthly 
income to pay all of Plaintiff's costs or attorney fees. The trial court 
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did not abuse its discretion in so finding. Likewise, Plaintiff Is not 
entitled to additional costs aad attorney fees incurred on this appeal. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE TRIAL COURT FINDINGS 
ABSENT A SHOWING OF CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION 
The standard of reviewing alimony cases has been established by 
the Utah Supreme Court and adopted by the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Paffell v. Paffell 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986) 
stated: 
"In an action for divorce, the trial court has 
considerable discretion to provide for spousal 
support, and this Court will not interfere with a 
trial court^s award of such support in a divorce 
proceeding absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion." 
In Boyel v. Boyel 735 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah 
Court of Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court standard of review 
stating: 
"This court will refrain from disturbing finding of 
the trial court in a divorce action unless a clear 
abuse of discretion is shown (cite omitted) the trial 
court is clearly in the best position to weigh the 
evidence, determine creditabllity and arrive at a 
factual conclusion . . . " 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED APPELLANT A $300 A MONTH 
AWARD OF ALIMONY AFTER CONSIDERING ALL THE FACTORS 
In setting an award of alimony, a trial court must consider three 
factors, (1) The financial condition and need of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for 
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him/herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support Paffell v. Paffell, supra; Nobel v. Nobel 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 
(Utah 1988); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Failure to consider these factors is an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion Paffell 732 P.2d at 101. 
(1) Financial Condition and Need of Receiving Spouse. Plaintiff 
testified before the trial court that her monthly living expenses for 
herself and the parties four children were $2400.00. The trial court 
awarded Plaintiff $715.00 per month child support for the parties minor 
children, and $300.00 per month for alimony. Additionally, Plaintiff 
was awarded property settlements in the amount of $1,231.05, First 
Security Bank CD, $513.27 First Security Bank Savings Account, one-half, 
or $7,897.22, of Defendant's ESIP from his employment at Morton Thiokol 
and a judgment in the sum of $1,175.00 representing the difference in 
personal property settlements. 
Although the testimony of Plaintiff shows her need to be greater 
than the amount of support awarded, this was taken into consideration 
when the trial court fixed an award of alimony stating: 
"I have read the exhibit. One of the aims of alimony 
obviously used to be historically to allow the spouse 
to live in a lifestyle to which she was accustomed, 
if I can use the art, obviously that is impossible. 
There isn't income between those two parties." (June 
Transcript, page 42, lines 13-25) 
(2) The ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient 
income for herself. The findings of the court were that the Plaintiff's 
computed income and demonstrated eraployability rate was approximately 
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$800.00 per month. Plaintiff's testimony showed that she is a 35-year 
old high school graduate without any reference to any health problems, 
or inabilities. Plaintiff testified that she had been back in the work 
force the last few years of the parties marriage. Plaintiff also 
testified that she has received an income as high as $1,000 per month in 
a given period. Plaintiff further testified she is a licensed 
beautician. 
The evidence before the trial court shows that Plaintiff is 
capable of full-time employment and/or capable of obtaining the 
marketable skills or training necessary to enhance her earning ability. 
Plaintiff's counsel stated: 
"Certainly Ms. Nielsen does have the ability to earn 
the Eight hundred dollars a month that the Court has 
found, and it would be ray hope that Ms. Nielsen, if 
she gets a decent alimony award would take advantage 
of the money to find a way to budget, and cut back, 
and do whatever she can do to get the schooling and 
then enhance her earning ability, and my hope would be 
that after a number of years she would be able to." 
(June transcript, pages 34, lines 10-18) 
(3) The ability of the responding spouse to provide support. The 
exhibits presented by Defendant, as well as his testimony at trial, 
demonstrated the Defendant's net take-home pay to be $1,719.00 per 
month. Payment of child support in the amount of $715.00 and alimony in 
the amount of $300.00, along with $50.00 per month paid towards 
Plaintiff's $800.00 in attorney fees, leaves Defendant with $654.00 for 
monthly living expenses and necessities. In the trial court findings: 
"I . . . recognize the fact given in the exhibits I 
have before me. Mr. Nielsen's spendable income is 
extremely limited." (June transcript, page 43, lines 
1-3) 
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"It doesn't give her (Plaintiff) what she has told 
this Court she needs to help her and the family." 
(June transcript, page 43, lines 24-25) 
"It doesn't leave the Defendant with what he needs to 
support himself in his new situation. I can't create 
extra money." (June transcript, page 44, lines 
1-3) 
Plaintiff's assertion that the trial court erred in limiting the 
alimony award to $300.00 is baseless. Given the Defendant's resources 
available, the trial court awarded Plaintiff the maximum amount of 
alimony which the Defendant had the ability to pay. 
The trial court took into consideration the three factors 
necessary in computation of the alimony awarded to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's claim that the support award did not equalize her standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage, is clearly one-sided. The 
divorce has obviously caused both parties economic hardship due to the 
limited amount of resources available to the parties. The trial court 
record reflects no abuse of discretion in awarding alimony. The trial 
court awarded support to Plaintiff that would equalize the parties 
standard of living given the income available. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA USED IN ESTABLISHING AN 
AWARD OF LONG-TERM ALIMONY AND THE TRIAL DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN SO FINDING 
Considering the circumstances of the parties and the standard of 
Paffell v. Paffell Supra set forth above, the trial court properly 
awarded Plaintiff alimony for a three year duration. 
In Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court 
attempted to establish a criteria for long-term alimony. In Jones the 
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court reversed a declining rehabilitative alimony award finding such 
award was inappropriate, and ordering permanent alimony, stating: 
"It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in 
her mid-50's with no substantial work experience or 
training will be able to enter the job market and 
support herself in anything even resembling the style 
in which the couple had been living. 
Similarly, in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) 
the court rejected a decreasing alimony award and requested the trial 
court to award permanent alimony after a 30-year marriage during which 
the wife had remained at home and maintained a household and had held 
part-time, short-terra, minimal-wage jobs during the marriage. See also 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 705 P.2d 615, 618. 
Unlike Jones and Rasband the circumstances of the Appellant does 
not meet the criteria for long-term alimony. 
As stated previously, the evidence before the Court shows 
Plaintiff as a 35-year old woman with a high school education. 
Plaintiff has a current computed earning capacity of $800.00 plus per 
month and has earned as high as $1,000.00 per month. Plaintiff is a 
licensed beautician, but has not sought employment with salons. 
Plaintiff suffers no health problems or limitations and is capable and 
qualified of full-time employment, school, or training to enhance her 
earning ability. 
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the trial court, limiting 
alimony to three years, is contrary to case law and is a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. The trend established by both the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and the circumstances of the 
parties in this situation make the award of temporary alimony 
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appropriate. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DEFENDANT TWO OF THE 
CHILDREN FOR TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS 
The recent case of Motes v. Motes 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) 
provides that the 1984 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, which 
automatically entitles the custodial parent dependency exemptions unless 
custodial parent signs a written declaration (Section 152) to the 
contrary, did not vest courts of their traditional power to allocate tax 
dependency exemptions. 
Under Motes Supra, this court held that State Courts retain their 
traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions. There was no 
finding suggesting that a court must order an execution of a Section 152 
Declaration. 
The trial court could not have abused its discretion as suggested 
by Plaintiff because the trial court did not order Plaintiff to execute 
a Section 152 Declaration. (The parties Decree of Divorce was entered 
at the trial court level before Motes.) 
Nevertheless, the trial court considered the financial resources 
of the parties by allowing Defendant only two of the parties children 
for tax deduction purposes until such time as alimony terminates: 
" What weight do you give the fact that though he would 
have a net of $2,000.00 net income after deducting 
his child support. The fact that ... she would also 
have a $1,515.00 at that time plus she receives alimony 
and also the benefit of the deduction, deductions for tax 
exemptions of the children, he would not, and he would have 
the alimony tax deduction and she would not." (June 
transcript, page 35, lines 20-25; page 36, lines 1-3) 
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The trial court then awarded Defendant two of the parties children 
as tax deductions stating: 
"I'm awarding alimony in the sura of $300.00. That will be 
a period of three years. During that period of time, tax 
deduction will be divided two and two. 
The record reflects that the trial court attempted to maximize 
Defendant's financial resources to meet his support obligations to 
Plaintiff, since the Defendant's income was greater than the Plaintiff 
and Defendant would be providing the majority of the financial support 
for the children, and since the deductions would have a greater value to 
Defendant than Plaintiff, the trial court used proper discretion in 
awarding Defendant two of the parties four children for tax deduction 
purposes. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES OR 
COSTS AT THE TRIAL OR ON THIS APPEAL 
An award of attorney fees in a divorce proceeding, and a decision 
to make such award, and the amount thereof, rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the Court. However, an award must be based on evidence of 
both (1) financial need and (2) reasonableness. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d at 1336. Where either of these two factors have not been shown, 
the Court has reversed awards of attorneys fees, Beals v. Beals, 682 
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984). 
(1) The moving party must show financial need. 
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff $800.00 of her $2,200.00 in 
attorneys fees incurred. Execution upon Defendant's payment was stayed 
on the condition of payment of $50.00 per month. Plaintiff had 
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previously paid Plaintiff's counsel a $500.00 retainer (Plaintiff 
testified that her father loaned her the money) leaving her with a 
balance of $900.00 due and owing Plaintiff's counsel. 
$2,200.00 Attorney fees 
800.00 Defendant ordered to pay 
500.00 Plaintiff's retainer 
$ 900.00 Balance 
Based on support payments paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff's earning capacity, and the trial court's award of cash assets 
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff clearly has the ability to pay her remaining 
balance due on her costs and attorney fees. 
Ongoing Monthly Support & Income 
$ 715.00 Child Support 
300.00 Alimony 
800.00 Computed Income 
$1,815.00 TOTAL 
Property Award Which Produce Immediate Cash 
$ 1,231.05 First Security Bank CD 
513.26 First Security Bank Savings Account 
7,897.22 Plaintiff's half of Defendant's ESIP 
1,175.00 Judgement for equity property settlement 
$10,816.53 TOTAL 
In considering an award of attorney fees, the trial court took 
into consideration Plaintiff's assets and support, and the Defendant's 
ability to pay, stating: 
"There's use of these assets which the parties may pay 
attorney fees also. So one of the factors, that's a 
major factor. I'm going to consider that to be as a 
factor. I am considering the fact of maybe some cash 
available to pay attorneys fees . . . " (June 
transcript, page 63, lines 6-10) 
"Given the three years of alimony payment I'm going to 
award [Plaintiff] $800.00 in attorneys fees. I'm 
going to stay execution on that however at $50.00 a 
month . . . I'm not sure the Defendant has ability to 
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make that payment . . . I do, however, think Plaintiff 
has some ability to make immediate payment toward that 
. . ." (June transcript, page 63, lines 16-25) 
Given the evidence before the Court, the trial used sound 
discretion in making an award of attorneys fees to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's substantial property settlement and monthly support and 
income placed Plaintiff in a position to shoulder her own attorneys 
fees. See Gardner v. Gardner 748 P.2d 1076, 1082 (Utah 1988). Further, 
the trial court could not abuse its discretion as to costs of 
litigation. At no time in the proceeding was evidence addressed to 
whether Plaintiff would be able to cover costs of litigation and thereby 
none was awarded. 
(2) The reasonableness of the amount of the reward. 
At trial, counsel for Plaintiff stated the number of hours 
expended on the case, and the hourly rate charged was set forth. 
Evidence does reflect an attempt to characterize the Plaintiff's 
attorney fees as reasonable. 
Plaintiff has failed to show a financial need or the inability to 
pay the remaining portion of her attorney fees. Although the fee seems 
to be reasonable, the record reflects that Defendant does not have the 
ability to pay the attorney fees already incurred, or Plaintiff's 
attorney fees incurred on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court heard and considered all the evidence. Plaintiff 
fails to show how the trial court abused its discretion in the amount or 
duration of the alimony awarded, fails to show how the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding Defendant two of the children for tax 
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exemption purposes, and fails to show how the trial court abused its 
discretion in Plaintiff's partial award of attorney fees. Plaintiff is 
not entitled to additional costs or attorney fees on this appeal. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's decision and dismiss 
this appeal. 
DATED this / 7 day of April, 1990. 
£go£y S&af>efund 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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